I.

The Continuously Playing Double Feature of the Rules of Evidence and the Constitution: How Do the Pieces Fit Together?
To determine whether evidence of an -out-of-court statement is excluded by either the rules of evidence or the Constitution, one must make up to four determinations in the following order: (1) Is the proffered evidence hearsay (FRE 801, Md. Rule 5-801) (see II. and IV.)? This step is essential, because if the evidence is nonhearsay (including FRE 801(d) categories), neither the hearsay rule (nor the Confrontation Clause) will exclude it. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by the introduction of the confession of an accomplice for the l10nhearsay purpose of rebutting respondent's testimony that his own confession was coercively derived from the accomplice's statement).
(2) IF it is hearsay, is it nonetheless not excluded by the hearsay rule, because it falls within an exception to that rule ?
(3) Even if the hearsay rule does not exclude it, do other evidence rules exclude it (e.g., PRE 403, (407) (408) (409) (410) (411) (412) , or privileges)?
/f it is hearsay but neither the hearsay rule nor other rules of evidence exclude it, then one must ask whether the Constitution excludes the evidence:
(a) /fit is hearsay, and it is offered at a trial on the merits against a criminal accused, and the evidence rules do not exclude it, is it "testimonial" hearsay? If so, does its admission comply with the confrontation clause (see III., IV., and V.)?
If it is offered in any other proceeding, to which the due process clause applies, is it reliable hearsay?
II. FIRST FULL-LENGTH FEA TURE: HEARSAY LAW (Both Civil and Criminal
Cases)
A. Hearsay in General 1.
The Definition of Hearsay: OCS + TOMA Evidence is hearsay if (1) an out~of-court statement of a person ("OeS") is being proved, and (2) in order for that oes to help to prove the fact it is being offered to prove today at trial, the fact-finder would have to assume that the out-of-court speaker or writer (the "'declarant") was correct about that fact. The shorthand for this last element is that the OCS is offered now at trial to prove "TOMA,"the truth of some matter that was (either explicitly or implicitly) asserted by the declarant when the declarant made the out-of-court statement.
If a hearsay objection is properly made, because the evidence includes an oes, the proponent of the evidence must meet the objection by explaining to the court how either the evidence is nonhearsay or it falls within a hearsay exception. Otherwise, the court may correctly sustain the objection.
2.
When is an OCS Not Offered to Prove TOMA? Similarly, if experts in a particular field reasonably rely on certain types of hearsay in reaching their opinions, FRE 703 and Md. provide that the court has discretion to admit that otherwise inadmissible hearsay basis, for the limited nonsubstantive purpose of explaining how the expert arrived at the opinion.
3.
The Two Elements of OCS: "Out-of-Court" and "Statement" This may be surprising, because, after all, this witness declarant can be cross-examined at trial. In this situation where the out-of-court declarant testifies at trial, there is therefore no confrontation clause issue -but there is a hearsay and other rules of evidence issue.
b.
"Statement" FRE 801(a) and Md. Rule 5-801(a) define a "statement," in tum, as "(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." It can fairly be said, then, that a "statement" is an assertion of fact(s) by a person. It does not include "statements" by animals or machines. When determining whether a statement is by a person or by a machine, consider whether there is a person who had crucial and direct input into the statement. For example, a hand-stamped "Received April 12,2003" on a document would be an OCS of a person asserting that the document was received on 4112/03, as likely would be a gas and electric bilI, asserting that the homeowner owed $310.06 for July 2007. Also consider whether, instead, the writing is relevant as circumstantial evidence without the need to cross-examine anyone (e.g., the mass-printed writing on a cocktail napkin, "Bohager's, Fells Point, Baltimore" offered as circumstantial evidence that the person who had the napkin in his pocket had been to that watering hole. See IV. Verbal (in words, either spoken or written) utterances are hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the matter that was directly asserted by the declarant. They are also hearsay if they are offered to prove the truth of an assertion implied by the declarant, i.e., their proponent is asking the fact-finder to infer that the declarant would not have made the utterance unless he or she believed a particular fact to be true, and the out-of-court utterance is offered to prove the truth of that fact the declarant apparently believed.
In Stoddard, the defendant was charged with the murder of a 3-year-old girl, Calen, who had been left in his care, along with an 18-month-old. The OCS was of the 18-month-old child, who said to her mother, "Is [the defendant] going to get me?" Because the evidence was relevant only if offered to prove a fact implied by her question, that the child was afraid of the defendant because she had seen him "get" Calen, it was inadmissible hearsay.
2.
The App. 436,681 A.2d 1181 App. 436,681 A.2d (1996 (finding the evidence to be non hearsay). Although the Carlton court employed a test different from Stoddard's, the result should remain the same after Stoddard . ...
BemadYIl
Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1,887 A.2d 602 (2005) , presented a situation where the same result could have been reached as was reached in Carlton, if the prosecutor had had the prescience to foresee the Court of Appeals' decision in Stoddard. The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana (and possession with intent to distribute) at the residence at 2024 Morgan Street in Edgewood. The evidence in question was a medical bill which police testified they seized at 2024 Morgan Street in Edgewood, Maryland; the bill was addressed to "Michael Bemadyn, 2024 Morgan Street, Edgewood, Maryland 21040."
As Judge Wilner, joined by Judge Battaglia, pointed out in his dissent, the bill with that name on it was relevant (it had probative value connecting Bemadyn to that address) simply because it wasfoulld at that address. (Consider if, instead, the bill had been found at a garbage dump-then it would have had no relevance unless we relied on the accuracy of the addresser of the bill.)
The prosecutor at Bemadyn's trial argued "TOMA," however, in his closing, when he stated that the folks at Johns Hopkins Bayview who had sent the bill "did not randomly pick that address," as they would have wanted the bill to be paid and would have made sure to send it to the correct address. The Court of Appeals found that the bill was inadmissible hearsay when used by the State in this fashion to establish that Bemadyn lived at that address. 
Had the
4.
Thank Heaven for Small Favors: The "Implied Assertion" Analysis is Not Applicable to Nonverbal Conduct Not Obviously Intended as a Statement "Out of court statement" includes oral or written statements in words and "nonverbal conduct of a person, it if is intended by the person as an assertion." FRE 801(a), Md. Rule 5-801(a). Examples of assertive nonverbal conduct include nodding "yes" or "no." Here we can easily identify what words the conduct was intended to mean.
In adopting Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, the Court of Appeals unequivocally adopted the rule that implied assertions from nonverbal conduct not intended as an assertion are not "statements" and thus cannot be hearsay. The jury is thought to more easily be able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of such evidence than when the hear an OCS ....
HYPO:
Suppose on retrial in Stoddard the State offers Mom's testimony that after the victim's death, when the defendant came to the door of the 18-month-old's home, the child saw him and ran and hid in a closet; Mom found her cowering, shaking and crying. Now there is no hearsay evidence! Unless the evidence is excluded on another ground (as it might be under Rule 5-602 or 5-403) the jury could consider the surviving child's actions as circumstantial evidence that she had reason to fear the defendant, which in turn is circumstantial evidence that she saw the defendant harm the victim. Her state of mind itself remains irrelevant; but because the evidence does not include an "OCS," the hearsay rule does not exclude it.
C. COMING ATTRACTIONS: Coates v. State
In Coates v. State, 175 Md. App. 588, 936 A.2d 852 (2007 ), cert. granted, 402 Md. 55, 936 A.2d 852 (Dec. 13, 2007 , statements of an almost 8-year-old to a SAFE pediatric nurse practitioner, regarding sexual abuse occurring over a year earlier, were admitted by the trial court as substantive evidence, under Md. Rule S-803(b)(4) (statements made by a declarant seeking "medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment"). The Court of Special Appeals reversed the resulting conviction, holding that there was inadequate evidence to support a finding that the child "understood that she was being seen for medical treatment or diagnosis." Although the nurse ordered testing for mY, there was "no indication that [the child] had any understanding ... , that she was at continued risk of developing a latent, sexually transmitted disease or mv."
The Coates CSA panel also commented, as to whether the Rule embraces statements identifying an abuser, that the State knew that the defendant no longer had any contact with the child; thus, "this was not a case in which there was a concern as to the identity of the perpetrator in order to prevent continued exposure of the child to the abuser."
The Court of Appeals granted the State's petition for certiorari on the following question: "Did a child abuse victim's statements to a nurse practitioner fall within the hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis?" .2d _,2008 WL 382938 (Md., Feb. 14,2008 , the Court of Appeals held that a prosecutor's factual proffer when presenting a guilty plea should have been admitted under Md. Rule 5-803(a)(2), as an adoptive admission by the State. The majority found that the trial court committed error by excluding the defense's evidence of the State's factual proffer when earlier presenting a guilty plea with regard to an accessory after the fact to the charged crime.
The State had adopted as true, and represented as true at the time, the accessory's statement that he saw a person other than Bellamy shoot the victim; the prosecutor also had advised the court that there was new evidence that Bellamy had told an informant that Bellamy had also shot the victim. The majority found the error harmless, because the earlier proffer at the least showed that Bellamy aided and abetted in the murder, which was all that was needed to convict him, and the jury was so instructed. Chief Judge Bell and Judge Wilner, dissenting, would have reversed the conviction. To clarify that the declarant's adoption by signature will suffice, and that the declarant need not have been the one to reduce the statement to writing, Md. Rule 5-802.1(a)(2) was amended by order of November 8,2005, effective January 1, 2006, to read: "A statement that is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony if the statement was ... (2) (Md. Feb. 13,2008) (no error in admitting witness's in-court identification of defendant when trial court properly found witness had adequate basis for identification independent of suppressed identification from photo array).
3.
Md. The confrontation clause applies only if the evidence offered is hearsay (see II.) (Crawford fn. 9) and then only if it is a certain type of hearsay: "testimonial" (i.e., in the nature of testimony and thus considered to be the statement of a "witness" within the meaning of the confrontation clause).
The constitutional question ought not be reached unless it is first detennined that the jurisdiction's rules of evidence do not exclude the evidence (see I.).
4.
When Does the Clause Apply?
The confrontation clause applies only:
( 1) in criminal cases; and only (2) to ''testimonial'' hearsay evidence; and only if such evidence is (3) offered by the prosecution, against an accused; and only if offered (4) in a trial on the merits of guilt or innocence.
How Can the Confrontation Clause Be Satisfied, When It Applies?
When the confrontation right applies to the proof of an OCS + TOMA, it may be satisfied in any of three ways:
The out-of-court declarant who made the testimonial hearsay statement (a) testifies at the trial and (b) the accused has an opportunity to crossexamine the declarant at trial (Crawford (fn. 9); Lawson v. State, 389 Md. 570, 587-89, 886 A.2d 876 (2005) ;
The declarant is unavailable to testify at trial (see Fed. R. Evid. 804(a) or Md. Rule 5-804(a» and the accused has earlier had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about his or her statement that is now being offered into evidence;
The accused has forfeited his or her confrontation right by engaging in wrongdoing (directly or in a conspiracy) that caused the declarant to be unavailable (as defined by FRE 804(a) and Md. ) to testify at the trial (see V.).2 2 An accused also may waive the right by failing to object, explicitly citing the confrontation clause.
Crawford and Davis require strategic changes by the prosecution. Before Crawford and Davis a case could have been prosecuted through the admission of excited utterances to police. In light of the first route to compliance with the confrontation clause, Crawford and Davis increase the prosecution's incentives to do everything possible to have the declarant testify at trial and thus be subject to cross-examination by the accused. 3 In light of the second route to compliance with the confrontation clause, the prosecution may begin to, more routinely, conduct a prompt preliminary hearing at which the defense has the opportunity to cross-examine. Then, if the declarant subsequently becomes unavailable, Crawford is satisfied.
Finally, if it believes that the witness's unavailability to testify has been caused by the accused's intimidation or other wrongdoing (such as threats, bribery, assault, or murder) then the prosecution will follow the Court's suggestions in Crawford and Davis to pursue a ruling that the accused hasforfeited his or her right to confront the witness (see V.).
B.
The Distinction Between Testimonial and Nontestimonial Statements
The Confrontation Clause Applies Only If the Hearsay is Testimonial
Crawford strongly hinted, and Davis held, that a criminal defendant's confrontation right applies only to "testimonial" hearsay statements.
What Constitutional Limits Apply If the Hearsay Evidence is Nontestimonial?
If the hearsay statement is "nontestimonial," the confrontation clause does not apply to its admission. Davis v. Washington. The only constitutional check will be the due process clause, under which a verdict that was based on unreliable hearsay would be constitutionally unsound.
As to what is "reliable" we can still look to Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) , for this due process purpose.
C.
How Can We Tell Which is Which? Crawford and Davis
Crawford
3 Sometimes, however, it is not in the state's power to have the declarant testify:
(1) Child abuse victims who are very young may be found to be unqualified to testify in court;
(2) Domestic violence victims may invoke a marital privilege not to testify, or
Witnesses of any kind may be afraid to testify, for fear of retaliation.
a.
Rationale and Limited Holding
Crawford finds the Sixth Amendment unclear on its face and therefore looks to the founders' intent when the Amendment was ratified in 1791. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, concludes that the founders were concerned that we not repeat a practice that had occurred during "Bloody Mary's" reign in England where -following the civil law practice rather than the common law's approach -justices of the peace gathered ex parte statements from witnesses and these were later offered into evidence, without the accused being given a chance to crossexamine the makers of the statements.
Justice Scalia (who, by the way, is coming to speak at VB Law April 24, 2007) remarks, "The involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are police or justices of the peace." He reasons that "witnesses are those who bear testimony," but declines to articulate a definition of "testimonial." Crawford explicitly states only that the following are testimonial under any definition: (1) "ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing"; (2) "plea allocution"; (3) "grand jury testimony"; (4) prior trial testimony; and (5) " Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements-or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation-as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation 6 under circumstances objectively indicating 4 Justice Scalia's selection of the fact that the declarant did not know he was speaking to a government agent, but did so "unwittingly," suggests that he believes that that fact makes the declarant's statement nontestimonial -even though, undoubtedly, the FBI informant's (the hearer's) intent was to gather evidence for the government. 5 In its first post-Davis decision, however, the Court of Special Appeals relied instead on Davis, to conclude that a particular dying declaration was nontestimonial. In Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 642, 912 A.2d 1 (2006 ), cert. denied, 395 Md. 315,902 A.2d 1059 (2007 , the first police officer arriving at the scene of a shooting asked the victim, "Who shot you?" The victim, who died within the hour, answered "Bobby." Judge Salmon, writing for the Maryland panel in a manner reminiscent of Louis L' Amour, pointed out "the strong smell of gunpowder still in the air." That fact, coupled with the officer's testimony that the victim "kept 'yelling out' the words 'help me, help me,'" "the situation was 'chaotic,'" the officer '''didn't even know if ... the person who caused that gunpOWder was still in the house,'" and "in the officer's view, it was still 'potentially even a dangerous situation ... , '" led the panel to conclude that the statement was nontestimonial under Davis because, "Viewed objectively, the primary purpose of Officer George's question does not appear to have been either to establish or prove past events for possible use at a trial." that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Although one might call 911 to provide a narrative report of a crime absent any imminent danger, McCottry's call was plainly a call for help against bona fide physical threat. Third, the nature of what was asked and answered in Davis, again viewed objectively, was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had happened in the past. That is true even of the operator's effort to establish the identity of the assailant, so that the dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon. And finally, the difference in the level of formality between the two interviews is striking. Crawford['s wife] was responding calmly, at the station house, to a series of questions, with the officer-interrogator taping and making notes of her answers: McCottry's frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator could make out) safe.
We conclude from all this that the circumstances of McCottry's interrogation objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. She simply was not acting as a witness; she was not testifying. * * * This is not to say that a conversation which begins as an interrogation to determine the need for emergency assistance cannot, as the Indiana Supreme Court put it, "evolve into testimonial statements," once that purpose has been achieved. In this case, for example, after the operator gained the information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the emergency appears to have ended (when Davis drove away from the premises). The operator then told McCottry to be quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of questions. It could readily be maintained that, from that point on, McCottry's statements were testimonial, not unlike the "structured police questioning" that occurred in Crawford.
c. Application to Hammon Facts
On the other hand, it held that in the companion case of Hammon v. Indiana, the domestic violence victim's (1) second set of oral statements to the responding police, in answer to their questions and (2) her affidavit signed at the scene were both testimonial. Justice Scalia analyzed the statements to the responding police as follows:
It is entirely clear from the circumstances that the interrogation [in Hammon] was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct-as, indeed, the testifying officer expressly acknowledged. There was no emergency in progress; the interrogating officer testified that he had heard no arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or break anything. When the officers first arrived, Amy told them that things were fine, and there was no immediate threat to her person. When the officer questioned Amy for the second time, and elicited the challenged statements, he was not seeking to determine (as in Davis) "what is happening," but rather "what happened." Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime .... 7 * * * It was formal enough that Amy's interrogation was conducted in a separate room, away from her husband (who tried to intervene), with the officer receiving her replies for use in his "investigat [ion] ." * * * Both declarants [Hammon's wife, Amy, and Crawford's wife, Sylvia] were actively separated from the defendant-officers forcibly prevented Hershel [Hammon] from participating in the interrogation. Both statements deliberately recounted, in response to police questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and progressed. And both took place some time after the events described were over. Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are inherently testimonial. * * * Amy's narrative of past events was delivered at some remove in time from the danger she described. And after Amy answered the officers' questions, he had her execute an affidavit, in order, he testified, " [t] If 911 operators are not themselves law enforcement officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911 callers. For purposes of this opinion (and without deciding the point), we consider their acts to be acts of the police.
As in Crawford v. Washington, therefore, our holding today makes it unnecessary to consider whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are "testimonial."
In footnote 1 in Davis, the Court qualified its reference to interrogation as follows: "This is not to imply, however, that statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily non testimonial. The Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation."
The Court seems to be moving toward adopting some version of one of the two following formulations of "testimonial" statements it had quoted but declined to explicitly adopt in Crawford:
8 "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent -that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially," Brief (2007) (holding that no government involvement is needed in order for a statement to be testimonial; here, more formal statements -in a letter given to a neighbor and in voicemails to declarant's child's teacher were testimonial, but declarant's oral statements to them were not).
How Did the Maryland Court of Appeals Interpret Crawford in Snowden?
In its first post-Crawford decision, Snowden v. State, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005) , the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 8 and lO-year-old girls' statements during an interview with a social worker were testimonial, under the following facts:
• The social worker was a county employee who described her position as a "sexual abuse investigator';
• She interviewed the children with a police detective present in the room;
• The express purpose of the interviews "was to develop their testimony for possible use at trial";
• Each child told her that "she was aware that she was being interviewed as a result of her accusations against [the defendant]"; and
• The children were interviewed "at a County-owned and operated facility unfamiliar to the children and used for the purpose of investigating and assessing victims of child abuse."
Snowden presaged Davis. The social worker in Snowden-like the 911 operator in Davis -was held to be acting as "an agent of the police," and the children's statements to her were made when there was no ongoing emergency or criminal activity. The Snowden court, like Davis, applied an objective rather than a subjective test. Snowden rejected the notion that the analysis should consider the young age of the declarant. Judge Harrell, writing for the Sno>vden Court, emphasized:
Most telling [was] the fact that [social worker] Wakeel's participation in this matter was initiated, and conducted, as part of a formal law enforcement investigation. The children were interviewed at the behest of Detective Davey of the Montgomery County Police Department, who was actively involved in the investigation. Unlike some cases in which statements to investigators were deemed nontestimonial because they were in the course of ascertaining whether a crime had been committed, the children's statements were elicited by Wakeel subsequent to initial questioning of them by the police and after the identity of a suspect was known. Indeed, Wakeel testified that she began her investigation with a police report in hand, which stated that "Michael Snowden had sexually abused these children."
The Snowden Court added this caveat:
Statements made to a school principal conducting a casual chat with a student, for example, do not present necessarily the same potential constitutional abuses as when a child's statement is made to a health or social work professional that is working in tandem with law enforcement in furtherance of an ongoing and formal criminal investigation. We leave to another day the question of whether such noninvestigatory statements would be admissible in light of Crawford.
5.
What About "Business Records" of the State? -i.e., "Public Records" -The Court of Appeals' Decision in Rollins Rollins v. State, 392 Md. 455, 897 A.2d 821 (2006) , the Court of Appeals affirmed a Court of Special Appeals' decision that ''the findings in an autopsy report of the physical condition of a decedent, which are routine, descriptive and not analytical, [and] which are objectively ascertained" were non-testimonial. The medical examiner-declarant had moved to California and did not testify, but his deputy medical examiner testified, basing her testimony on the autopsy report. [T]he autopsy report, as redacted, contained non-testimonial hearsay statements in nature that were admissible under either the business or public records exceptions to the hearsay rule. We further hold that, under the facts of the instant case, the availability of a witness is immaterial to the question of admissibility of hearsay evidence under either the business or public records exception. Opinions, speculation, and other conclusions drawn from the objective findings in autopsy reports are testimonial and should be redacted before the report is admitted into evidence.
In
* * *
The information that was not redacted from the autopsy report, while it might eventually be used in a criminal trial, was not created for that express purpose, and was statutorily required to be determined by the medical examiner and placed into the report pursuant to § 5-311 of the Health General Article.
Accord Costley v. State, 175 Md. App. 90, 114-26,926 A.2d 769 (2007) . But see United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding autopsy reports to be nontestimonial in their entirety; as in Rollins, a doctor who had not conducted the autopsies testified at trial).
With a similar focus on the routine nature of the statement, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that public records contained in the accused's "penitentiary packet" -records of his convictions, his fingerprints and a photograph -were not testimonial. Moreover, their certification as accurate copies of those public records, by the Oklahoma records custodian and by Oklahoma's Secretary of State, were also routine, nontestimonial statements. No. 07-8291, Dec. 14,2007) , the defendant had been stopped on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway and arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. A sample of his blood was taken and was tested at an Armed Forces Institute lab. The lab technicians who put the blood in the machines did not testify at trial. Rather, the lab director, Dr. Barry Levine, gave expert testimony, based on the test results, that the defendant's blood contained PCP and alcohol.
The majority of the three-judge panel, in an opinion by Judge Niemeyer, held that the test results were not "statements" of the lab technicians; rather, they were statements of machines and thus were not hearsay (see II.A.3.b.) .9 No issue as to authentication or chain of custody 9 The majority explained:
The Institute's Forensic Toxicology Laboratory subjected the blood sample to "headspace gas chromatography" to identify whether ethanol was in the blood and to "immunoassay or chromatography" to screen for the presence of amphetamine, barbiturates, benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, cocaine, opiates, and was presented, and the lab technicians' knowledge of the chemical analysis of the blood could only have come from the test results, as Dr. Levine's had. Accord United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359,361 (7th Cir. 2008 [W]hen defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce. While defendants have no duty to assist the State in proving their guilt, they do have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial system. We reiterate what we said in Crawford: that ''the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds" (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158-159). That is, one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.
In dictum he added:
phencyclidine, using a Hewlett Package HP 6890 series gas chromatograph machine and computers with HP ChemStation software. After lab technicians subjected the blood sample to testing, the instruments printed out some 20 pages of data and graphs. Based on the data, the director of the lab and its chief toxicologist, Dr. Barry Levine, issued a report to the United States Park Police, stating that the blood sample "contained 27 mgldL of ethanol" and that the sample tested positive for phencyclidine, containing "0.04 mg.L of phencyclidine as quantitated by gas chromatograph/spectrometry." While Dr. Levine did not see the blood sample and did not conduct any of the tests himself, three lab technicians operating under his protocols and supervision conducted the tests and then presented the raw data from the tests to him.
The raw data were mechanical computer printouts with each page headed by the date of the test, the machine operator, an identification of the sample, its dilution factor, and other similar information, and containing computer-generated graphs and data reporting the results produced by the chromatograph machine.
Judge Michael dissented both on this point and as to the majority's second holding, which was that, even had the machines' statements been hearsay, they were not "testimonial" as they described a "present condition of the blood" rather than a "past event." 498 F.3d 232.
We take no position on the standards necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts using Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which codifies the fOlfeiture doctrine, have generally held the Government to the preponderanceof-the-evidence standard, see, e.g., Ullited States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 762 (C.A.72002) . State courts tend to follow the same practice, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 Mass. 526, 542, 830 N.E.2d 158, 172 (2005) . Moreover, if a hearing on forfeiture is required, Edwards, for instance, observed that "hearsay evidence, including the unavailable witness's out-of-court statements, may be considered."
B.
The is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the statement is offered against a party that has engaged in, directed, or conspired to commit wrongdoing that was intended to and did procure the unavailability of the declarant of the statement, as defined in Maryland Rule 5-804.
(b) Subject to subsection (c) of this section, before admitting a statement under this section, the court shall hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury at which:
(1) The Maryland Rules of Evidence are strictly applied; and (2) The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the party against whom the statement is offered engaged in, directed, or conspired to commit the wrongdoing that procured the unavailability of the declarant, (c) A statement may not be admitted under this section unless:
(I) The statement was: the federal rule, the Maryland statute is restricted so as to apply only to trials for certain crimes." Second, the Maryland statute is intended to provide that unlike in other preliminary determinations by the trial judge (outside the hearing of the jury) as to admissibility of evidence under Md. , the other Maryland Rules of evidence (including the hearsay rule) will be "strictly applied" at this preliminary stage. The preliminary facts thus must be proved either by the testimony of another witness who has first-hand knowledge of them, or by the unavailable witness's out-of-court statements that qualify under a hearsay exception, such as that for excited utterances.
Third, the statute applies a burden of "clear and convincing evidence" at this stage, unlike the ordinary burden of a preponderance of the evidence. This is a departure from the Maryland case law which has applied the clear and convincing standard only when evidence of an accused's "other crimes" is to be admitted before the jury, the trier of fact. Under the forfeiture doctrine, the jury does not hear of the party's wrongdoing that made the witness unavailable, but only of the unavailable declarant's out-of-court statement, which is directly relevant to the pending charge. (It should be noted that evidence of that wrongdoing might come in, however, under a preexisting, independent route, such as that of wrongful acts showing "guilty knowledge." See Md. (5), Committee Note.) (i) Given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition; (ii) Reduced to writing and signed by the declarant; or (iii) Recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the statement; and (2) As soon as is practicable after the proponent of the statement learns that the declarant will be unavailable, the proponent notifies the adverse party of: (i) The intention to offer the statement; (ii) The particulars of the statement; and (iii) The identity of the witness through whom the statement will be offered. The types of statements potentially admissible under both Maryland codifications, however, are narrowed from those permissible under FRE 804(b)(6), to only recorded or written and signed statements (the same types that also are potentially substantively admissible prior inconsistent statements under Md. Rule 5-802.1(a). Thus, statements made by those witnesses who were murdered preemptively or intimidated before their statements were recorded or written and signed are not included under the Maryland codifications.
The Maryland codifications also add a requirement that the proponent of the evidence must provide notice of its intent to offer evidence under those hearsay exceptions.
D.
Impeachment of the Evidence Admitted under a Forfeiture Theory
If the judge decides to admit proof of any hearsay statement, then any witness who testifies to it will of course be subject to full cross-examination and impeachment before the jury. But, under both FRE 806 and Md. wrongdoing, a statement that (i) was (a) given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition; (b) reduced to writing and was signed by the declarant; or (c) recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the statement, and Oi) is offered against a party who has engaged in, directed, or conspired to commit wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness, provided however, the statement may not be admitted unless, as soon as practicable after the proponent of the statement learns that the declarant will be unavailable, the proponent makes known to the adverse party the intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it. (B) Criminal Causes. In criminal causes in which a witness is unavailable because of a party's wrongdoing, admission of the witness's statement under this exception is governed by Code, Courts Article, § 10-901.
rehearing en bane denied (Dec. 17, 2007 ) (Michigan state trial court's refusal to allow prisoner to impeach hearsay evidence -preliminary hearing testimony of unavailable declarant -with declarant's criminal record violated habeas prisoner's confrontation right, and under facts of case was not harmless error).
E.
TRAILER NOW A V AILABLE: Giles v. California and the Common Law Forfeiture Doctrine
The common law constitutional forfeiture doctrine is considerably broader than the rules of evidence codified in either Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) or the Maryland statute and rule.
The common law constitutional doctrine has been applied by various state and federal courts whenever the opposing party's wrongdoing has been preliminarily found by the trial court, by a preponderance of the evidence, to have caused the unavailability of the declarantregardless whether that party was shown to have intended to prevent the declarant from testifying. E.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F..3d 364 (6th Cir. 2005); State v. Jensen, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518,529-36 (2007) . In this situation, the confrontation right has been held to have been forfeited by that party.
In People v. Giles, 40 Ca1.4th 833, 152 P.3d 433 (2007) , cert. granted sub nom. Giles v. Califomia, 128 S.Ct. 976 (U.S. Jan. 11,2008) (No. 07-6053), the California Supreme Court held that the defendant's killing of the victim forfeited his Confrontation Clause challenge to the victim's hearsay statements that she had made during an earlier domestic violence investigation. The court found the statements to have been properly admitted, as they fell within a California hearsay exception for prompt reports of domestic violence. Like most courts addressing the issue, the California Supreme Court held that the applicable burden of proof of preliminary facts as to the defendant's having caused the declarant's unavailability is a preponderance of the evidence. The trial judge determines whether these facts exist under the equivalent of FRE 104(a) and Md. , outside the hearing of the jury. Two weeks before her death, Julie gave this letter to her neighbor:
Plu.w.t+ /',"'"'t1,;'UJ r.,.1,~'t" D.4fP'~f~ , I
R(,I) f(o:5~f\ or 7)ij~c.{rv'" i2ci""'~b"rj- (1) Is the lettcr hearsay?
(2) Does it (or any part of it) fall within a hearsay exception?
Do other rules of evidence cxclude it? Would admitting only part of it be misleading?
